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Abstract 
Toward the end of World War 2, British and U.S. governments created a joint program to 
investigate German technology and requisitioned numerous technical documentations, some of 
which were opened to public as technical reports. Japanese industries, refereeing them to as the “PB 
reports”, tried to obtain and utilize them for their postwar recovery until they started enthusiastic 
technology introduction by technology licensing in 1950’s. This study describes the dissemination 
process of PB reports in Japan and evaluates their impact. 
 A few engineers mainly in chemical industry who were belonged to companies, universities 
and national research institutes recognized the great value of PB reports, and then pressed Japanese 
government to introduce them with a State budged. Not only the individuals, but also the 
governmental organs established in the postwar democratization process of science and technology 
played important roles for policy making of package purchase of PB reports from U.S. government 
in 1952. 
     In the case of dyestuff and caustic soda, some joint R&D groups were organized in academic 
circles and industrial associations to share the information from PB reports which contained 
classified factory data of IG Farben, Bayer and so on. Japanese companies utilized them to 
domesticate German chemical products and develop their original technologies. On the other hand, 
the case of electronics parts shows that small companies which could not afford to introduce 
technology from foreign companies by their own received benefit by the reports and got an 
opportunity for their development. As a result, a technology gap between Japan and advanced 
countries which had widened during the war were reduced till the end of 1950’s. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the main reasons for Japan’s technological development after WWII is believed to be 
the enthusiastic introduction of technology from advanced countries. During the war, given the 
situation that Japan was isolated from the international scientific and technological exchange network, 
it fell far behind advanced countries. After its defeat in the war, Japan attempted to re-introduce 
technology into the country. Many studies have focused on technology licensing between foreign and 
Japanese companies and its crucial role in improving product quality and production efficiency in 
various industries such as iron and steel, electronics, chemicals, etc., especially from the 1950s to the 
1960s. 
In order to successfully acquire these technologies, Japanese companies first had to find 
technology that was appropriate for introduction into the country. Technology historian Tetsuro 
Nakaoka emphasizes the importance of previous studies conducted by Japanese companies. Japanese 
companies did not search aimlessly for foreign technology. The research activities of these companies 
were well developed, and helped them to understand the specific technological problems that they 
faced before they made license agreements. As a result, they were able to accurately apply the 
technologies that they introduced, resulting in a dramatic and immediate improvement in their 
technology１. Therefore, R&D activities in Japan during wartime and the rehabilitation period should 
not be ignored when studying Japanese postwar technological development. 
Immediately after the war, when they could hardly come by the latest technical journals that 
were published in foreign countries, Japanese engineers in various fields took every possible measure 
to obtain technology information from abroad. A precious source for them was “PB reports.” PB 
reports were technological documents published by the U.S. government from 1946 onwards, most of 
which had been requisitioned from factories based in Nazi Germany. American historian, John 
Gimbel, who comprehensively studied the process, claimed that these technologies were a blessing 
for not only the military but also the private sector in postwar America２. This forced technology 
transfer from Germany to the U.S. was peculiar to the occupation period. Moreover, these documents 
were not intended for exclusive American use and were scattered all over the world. Therefore, 
through these PB reports, German technology was first transferred to the U.S. and then to other 
countries, including Japan. In this “two-step” technology transfer process, the latter step seems to not 
have received much attention in previous studies that have dealt with technology transfer. As 
mentioned above, Japan was one of the countries that tried to obtain PB reports and apply them to 
their postwar industrial recovery and development. Although science historian Shigeru Nakayama has 
already mentioned PB reports３, no research has precisely estimated the value of these reports in 
Japan’s postwar technological development. This study describes the dissemination process of the 
reports in Japan and evaluates their impact. 
It is not sufficient to focus only on a company’s business activities. There were other related 
parties involved in the process, such as politicians, scientists, engineers, academic societies, public 
and governmental institutions, and business associations. Some of these parties had been conducting 
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R&D activities since the prewar period or had established themselves during wartime mobilization. 
Although a comprehensive examination of these players is beyond the scope of this study, their 
activities will be referred to only to the extent that they relate to the PB reports. In the next section, 
based on John Gimbel’s work, the outline of the PB reports is described briefly. The process of the 
introduction of these reports into Japan is described in Section 3. Case studies in Section 4 illustrate 
the impact of PB reports on technological development, mainly in the chemical industry around the 
1950s. 
 
２．PB reports 
According to Gimbel, Britain and America created a special military unit in 1944, the “T-forces,” 
to gather German technological information. They also created a “Combined Intelligence Objective 
Subcommittee (CIOS),” whose duty was to select targets for the T-Forces with the support of the 
“Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC)” on the American side. TIIC consisted of more 
than 10 subcommittees that represented various industries. A large number of people from the 
business field became members and recommended numerous targets to investigate and capture４.  
After the War, many technologists who had joined these investigation programs were discharged 
from military service. However, they enthusiastically claimed that the technologies they had found in 
occupied German areas were much superior to those of American industry. They recommended, as a 
result, that the U.S. government continue and expand its investigation programs. Meanwhile, in 
August 1945, President Truman ordered the disclosure of scientific and technical information that had 
been developed with governmental funds. The newly established interdepartmental “Publication 
Board” screened the investigations to be released and then put reference numbers on them with the 
initials “PB,” to publish. In contrast to the Army, which was reluctant to disclose information, the 
Department of Commerce was the most enthusiastic to disclose information in order to promote 
postwar industrial recovery. The department created an “Office of Technical Service (OTS)” to 
investigate German technology themselves. The OTS selected and recruited specialists from various 
industries in America through “Technical Industrial Intelligence Branches (TIIB)”; these specialists 
were then dispatched to Europe. In Europe, the “Filed Information Agency Technical (FIAT)” 
supplied equipment for transportation and communication and helped in the interrogation of German 
engineers５. 
FIAT and OTS together analyzed the excavated material. In order to promote the use of PB 
reports, the Publication Board and its successor, the OTS, offered this information to the general 
public through the weekly “Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Research Reports.” Even after 
the investigation in Germany was completed and FIAT was closed in July 1947, the Department of 
Commerce carried such activities on till the end of July 1948, when the OTS drastically downsized 
their operations. The government, however, decided to make the documents and microfilms available 
to the public６. The U.S. government maintains till date the policy of disclosing research results 
developed with governmental funds and continues to issue technical report series and bibliographies, 
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as shown in Table 1. 
By the early 1950s, the volume of reports was over 100,000, comprising 7.4 billion pages. The 
documents requisitioned in Germany accounted for an overwhelming majority (Table 2). The release 
of reports on German technology peaked in 1948 and drastically decreased from 1949 onwards７. 
Even after FIAT closed in 1947 and the OTS’ operations were downsized, there remained a large 
volume of material to be analyzed. To complete their mission, the OTS gave up checking all the 
reports one-by-one and assigned PB numbers not to each report, but to “microfilms” that contained 
about a 100 reports each. The total volume of microfilm was over 5000 reels, which contained 
numerous reports to be disposed of without complete analysis or detailed abstracts. Therefore the 
bibliography issued around this period was also useless and caused engineers inconvenience in 
locating the appropriate reports８. In Japan, however, persons and organizations cooperated to solve 
this problem. 
The reports dealt with a variety of technological subjects, mainly chemistry, electricity, 
aeronautical engineering, and mechanical engineering. Moreover, the reports contained not only 
abstract or scientific knowledge but also concrete industrial technology such as descriptions of 
manufacturing methods that contained precise designs of equipment. For example, the German 
engineers at IG Farben, who were interrogated by a U.S. investigation team, had served the company 
in important positions (Table 3). The information they provided was received with surprise not only 
by the Americans but also by the Japanese. 
 
３. Introducing PB reports to Japan  
       A series of bibliographies, not original reports, were distributed by the U.S. government and 
sent to Japan in 1948. The National Diet Library (NDL) in Japan received and stored these 
bibliographies, which were not made public right away９ . It is unclear why they were kept 
unpublicized or who first received the reports in Japan. Masamitsu Yoshimura, a chemical consulting 
engineer, claimed that Mitsubishi Chemical Company accidentally received information about the 
bibliographies from NDL in the summer of 1949. A researcher from the company recognized the value 
of these bibliographies on the first reading; the researcher then transcribed these bibliographies at the 
research institute. After the bibliographies were explored, some PB reports were selected and purchase 
orders for copies were made directly to the U.S. government in the winter of 1949. The company 
utilized the purchased reports to reduce the production cost of sulfadiazine, an effective medicine for 
bacterial diseases such as pneumonia, gonorrhea, and suppuration１０. 
Meanwhile a few Japanese engineers were becoming aware of the existence of American 
documents that were technologically important. They frequently visited the CIE library, which was 
established in Tokyo in November 1945 by the Civil Information and Education section, GHQ/SCAP. 
The main purpose of this library was to make foreign magazine back issues available to Japanese 
citizens. After the war, engineers could access foreign journals only here１１. Among the engineers 
from the chemical industry, Eiji Nakabachi, a technical official at the Tokyo Industrial Research 
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Institute (TIRI), visited the CIE library almost daily to check the latest technological articles. He 
noticed that a lot of the research published in America quoted PB reports. At first, he could not figure 
out what “PB reports” were or how to get them in Japan. One day in 1950, however, he accidentally 
got hold of a copy of a PB report; he was surprised to discover that the report contained important 
factory data from IG Farben and precise production know-how of an organic dye. He made several 
copies to distribute to Japanese chemical companies１２. However, there was still no way for him to 
check other PB reports. In February 1952, he heard that a department in GHQ/SCAP that was 
concerned with patent management had presented the bibliographies to the Japan Patent Office (JPO). 
He immediately visited the JPO to check the bibliographies and discovered that there were many 
other reports that contained top German manufacturing secrets. For example, he recognized the 
existence of 60 microfilms on operating procedures in the IG Farben factory; the original documents 
contained over 50,000 pages. He also found some reports that had the seal “Streng Vertraulig (strict 
secrecy),” which dealt with an important analytical method. TIRI decided to import a copy of over 
10,000 pages１３. TIRI was Japan’s foremost national research institute and had a long R&D tradition 
in the chemical field, dating back to prewar days. Under Nakabachi’s instructions, the dyestuffs 
laboratory at TIRI imported several hundred reports and issued reference summaries for the Japanese 
chemical industry１４. 
       Some engineers got the chance to go to America on a technology inspection tour. A technical 
official at the chemical department in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) went to 
America in 1950 and brought back several PB reports related to plastic technology. He did his official 
duty by distributing them widely in the Japanese plastic industry; the information was received with 
surprise１５. In the soda industry, Tatsuzo Okada, a professor at Kyoto University, visited America 
between September and December in 1950 and returned to Japan with PB reports. The Japan Soda 
Industry Association (JSIA) delivered copies of these reports to member companies and organized a 
joint-research group to study them１６.  
These cases are probably the earliest encounters of Japanese engineers with PB reports. The 
existence of PB reports gradually became known in the society of Japanese engineers and scientists. 
However, it was still not easy for individual Japanese to purchase reports in foreign currency. 
Therefore the package purchase of all PB reports was suggested. Masamitsu Yoshimura was the key 
person behind this initiative. Yoshimura had visited the JPO at the same time as Nakabachi and had 
also recognized the importance of the PB reports. He was a column writer of scientific and 
technological topics for NIKKEI news. His article in May 1952, which introduced PB reports, caused 
a sensation. As a result of his petition to purchase all the reports from the U.S. government, NDL 
organized a committee to investigate and evaluate the reports１７. 
There were two organizations that were related to this process, the Science Council of Japan 
(SCJ) and the Scientific and Technical Administration Commission (STAC), both were established in 
1949. According to science historian Tetsu Hiroshige１８, Japan’s scientific system was severely 
criticized as the main cause of Japan's defeat: the confrontation of Japan’s administrative organ, the 
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inconsiderate bureaucracy for science, the factional strife by scientist themselves and so on. On the 
other hand, it was also pointed out that the newly postwar science system should be the main 
contributor for postwar economic recovery and the birth to a cultured nation. Under the initiative of 
scientists who had close connections with Harry C. Kelly at the Scientific and Technical Division, 
Economic and Scientific Section (ESS/ST), GHQ/SCAP, the Committee for Reform of Science 
Research Structure decided to establish SCJ１９. SCJ aimed to discuss important matter on science 
and technology and recommend desirable policy to government on behalf of scientists of the country. 
STAC was established under the Prime Minister’s Office to strengthen administrative cooperation 
between ministries in the field of science. Some scientists include physicist Seiji Kaya, Ryokichi 
Sagane and chemist Naoto Kameyama who were the professors of Tokyo Imperial University and 
enthusiastic to reform Japan’s science system argued that they should enter the policy-making of the 
government and claimed a powerful scientific administrative agency which scientist could participate 
as a principal. But as a result of heated discussion with an opposition group who emphasized that 
scientist should try to distance themselves from politics, SCJ and STAC couldn’t get biding force to 
government and became only a consultative agency２０.  
However in the case of PB reports, SCJ and STAC could be influential to the government. SCJ, 
at an administration committee held in June 1952, resolved to recommend that the Japanese 
government purchase all the PB reports. It then filed a petition with the Prime Minister, Shigeru 
Yoshida. This idea had been suggested by the Chemical Society of Japan headed by Kameyama who 
was mentioned above and also the President of the SCJ２１. 
On the other hand at STAC meeting, Kaya, represented the SCJ, submitted a request to the 
Ministry of Finance for a budget to purchase all the PB reports２２. He emphasized that the PB reports 
contained so much important technical information that he was worried that the U.S. government 
would stop issuing them before the Japanese government’s decision to purchase them came through. 
The Ministry of Finance replied that they would consider this subject and would shortly come to a 
conclusion２３. 
The National Diet responded quickly to the request from the SCJ. Before the discussion on 
purchasing the reports began, Hideo Maki, a professor in the Faculty of Engineering at Tokyo 
University, had mentioned the PB reports about vat dye at the House of Councilors, which was held 
in March 1952. He explained that research on vat dye had progressed dramatically in recent years 
because PB reports had revealed all the secrets of German chemical technology, which Japanese 
companies could apply domestically２４. In July, just after Yoshimura’s article had received much 
attention, the House of Representatives passed a resolution to request the government to purchase all 
the PB reports immediately２５. A few days later, the Librarian of the NDL mentioned that he was 
aware that many concerned parties—such as MITI, JPO, and SCJ—had been enthusiastically 
studying the bibliographies. He said that the NDL had also been considering importing all the PB 
reports２６. A proposal for their budget was presented to Parliament at the end of the month２７. As a 
result, by the end of the year, over 69 million yen from a supplementary national budget for fiscal 
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year 1952 was assigned for the import of the PB reports. This political measure enabled all Japanese 
citizens—that is, those from both big chemical companies and small companies in various 
industries—to utilize PB reports for their R&D activities. 
 
４．Case Studies 
Although it is a nearly impossible to comprehensively investigate the usage pattern of the 
reports in Japan at the time, according to research conducted by NDL in 1955, 60% of users 
comprised scientists and engineers in the field of chemical technology２８. The following cases show 
how PB reports were applied in postwar technological development. 
In the dyestuffs industry, TIRI continued reviewing many reports, especially those related to IG 
Farben’s products. Among the 149 kinds of acetate rayon dye sold by the company under the trade 
name “Celiton,” TIRI analyzed 140 kinds for their chemical structure, mixture of dispersant, and 
production techniques２９. The PB reports were indispensable to other researchers in the Japanese 
chemical industry in their R&D activities. A researcher in a major chemical company, Nippon 
Kayaku Company, recollected that his main job at the time had been to decipher German chemical 
technology through the PB reports３０.  
In the prewar days, Japanese companies had only been able to produce low-quality direct 
dyestuffs. The German company Bayer was the lone supplier of high-quality products, under the 
brand name “Sirius.” However, after the war, Nippon Kayaku Company began to develop 
high-quality dyestuffs. PB reports helped the company to understand the chemical structure of Sirius 
dyestuffs and to develop effectively new dyestuffs. The company continued to collect reports and 
other foreign patents about dyestuffs. They recognized the usability of an intermediate product that 
was stocked in their factories for improving light fastness. On the other hand, the black direct dye 
that was then used for machine-sewing-cotton did not have enough color fastness for washing, and it 
easily ran color on shirts. Having obtained technological information from the PB reports, they began 
to develop a new black dye with high washing fastness. They consequently expanded their market to 
the spinning industry. Their domestication of “Sirius” class high-quality dyestuff rapidly progressed 
after the 1950s. Due to their R&D activities, the company was awarded the Okochi prize in 1964, 
which is given for distinguished achievement based on excellent inventions and ideas３１. In another 
case, by referring to PB reports, a new production technology for dye intermediate was introduced 
into Japanese companies. This technology contributed to reducing the consumption of sulfuric acid, 
which led to a reduction of production costs３２.  
     The caustic soda industry recovered rapidly after 1950 from wartime damage３３. As shown in 
Table 4, their manufacturing plants were converted from an ammonia soda process to an electrolytic 
soda process in the 1950s. The electrolytic process generated chlorine as a by-product, which could 
be used as a raw material in producing vinyl chloride. The industry was growing very fast during 
this period. Although caustic soda had mainly been used to produce rayon, the scale of production 
was not as large as that of vinyl chloride. As a result, the sales of chlorine products became more 
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important than those of caustic soda. Therefore, Japanese chemical companies expanded their 
production capacity by introducing the electrolytic process３４.  
The most important equipment used in this method was the electrolytic cell. There are 
basically two types of cells, the mercury process cell and the diaphragm process cell. Professor 
Okada pointed out that the diaphragm process cell had developed mainly in America and accounted 
for over 95% of their production capacity just after the War. On the other hand, the lower price of 
mercury prompted the development of the mercury process cell in Germany. IG Farben had 
enthusiastically developed these cells in response to the growing demand for chlorine during 
wartime３５. Table 4 indicates that the mercury process cell became popular in Japan. Although the 
mercury process cell created less impurities and an exceedingly better product, this technology 
consumed more electric energy, which could have been reduced by expanding its electric 
capacity３６. As mentioned earlier, Professor Okada had visited the U.S. in 1950 and brought back 
PB reports on soda technology. He had visited Dr. W. C. Gardiner at the Mathieson Alkali Company 
and chemical consultant, Robert B. MacMullin, who had worked for the U.S. Chlorine Industry 
Team (which had been dispatched to Germany under TIIB)３７. Okada had been studying IG 
Farben’s mercury process cell since 1946. Then some soda companies, such as Ajinomoto and 
Mitsui Chemical Company, cooperated with Okada under the auspices of JSIA. In prewar days, 
domestic soda companies kept their technology secret, and few technology disclosure and exchange 
between them was allowed. However as the wartime economy got deepened, soda companies had to 
make use of domestic highest technology in order to increase the production of soda with less 
material and some technological research council and informal gatherings started in April 1941. 
After defeat of the war, as soon as JSIA was established in 1948, technological expert committees 
were founded in the field of ammonia soda process and electrolytic soda process which were 
renamed and expanded in 1950３８. JSIA became a base of technological exchange for domestic soda 
companies which longed to get foreign newest technology information such as PB reports. An 
engineer at Ajinomoto recollected that the PB reports were full of originality in the operation data, 
the design specifications and the improvement technology. He gleaned most of the ideas and 
knowledge in the field of electrolytic techniques from them３９. On the basis of technology 
developed by IG Farben and Mathieson Alkali Company, Japanese companies improved the 
mercury process cell and their technology came to be regarded as the world's highest level around 
1955４０. 
   In addition to the chemical industry, a case of electronics industry proves that PB reports 
contributed to the development of Japanese small firms. A German company, Bosch Corporation 
had developed “Metalized Paper (MP) Condenser” during the war. MP condenser was smaller than 
existing one by 70%, and had a “Self Healing Action”, an innovative recovery mechanism from 
damage. In Japan, captain Ito Yôji of the Naval Technical Research Institute ordered to investigate 
them in 1944. Professor Saitou Yukio of Tokyo Institute of Technology and some big electronics 
companies such as Hitachi also started investigating them４１. Despite of their effort, the condenser 
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couldn’t be in practical use before the end of the war. 
On the other hand, there were a lot of small firms which produced electronics components as 
subcontractors of big companies which produced electric wave weapons. After the war, with rising 
demand for components assembled in radio receivers, not a few companies began developing their 
original technology４２. Among such small companies, Matsuo Electronics Company founded in 
1949 with only 7 members started their business by producing condensers for radio receivers. They 
sold their product to merchants in Osaka prefecture then expanded customers to big electric and 
electronics companies such as Yokogawa Electric and Sony. The company recognized that MP 
condenser would have had high potential demand because reduced size components were suitable 
for assembling more a precision electronics instrument such as television set. However the PB 
number can’t be identified, the company’s history describes that PB report was only information 
they could obtain about MP condenser and they tried to develop just by following it. The company 
started to produce the condenser from January 1954. Just two month later, Sony ordered them and 
required to deliver 30 thousands condensers within one month for assembling their transistor radios. 
As a result, Matsuo Electronics Company expanded product facility and customers rapidly４３. This 
episode implies that even the small company could get a chance to develop and keep up with larger 
electronics company by utilizing PB reports.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The technology gap between Japan and other advanced countries had widened during WWII. 
As we saw in the case of the chemical industry, the PB reports supplied important information to 
Japanese engineers. On the contrary in Germany, the dyestuff industry was unable to develop new 
products and remained at the same technology level as that in the PB reports even at the end of the 
1950s４４. PB reports reduced the technology gap between Japan and Germany４５.  
     It should be noted that the U.S. investigation team requisitioned not only documents but also 
numerous machines and equipment. Moreover, they took many German technologists back to the 
U.S.４６ . The U.S. government and industries could comprehensively utilize this technology 
information. On the other hand, all the information Japan could obtain was in document form. With 
these constraints, Japan made its best effort to utilize the PB reports. 
     First of all, a few engineers in various fields, such as universities, public and national institutes, 
and consulting businesses, recognized the importance of the reports. Some technical officials and 
academicians especially played an important role by never trying to withhold information. On the 
contrary, they actively delivered PB reports to the concerned people. Such openness seems to have 
been a result of their official positions. To understand their quick response to the reports, their 
research experience during wartime should be investigated. The following questions have yet to be 
answered: On what subjects was research conducted? How did they recognize the limits of their 
research capabilities during wartime science and technology mobilization? 
In addition to the individuals, SCJ and STAC requested the Japanese Government to purchase 
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all the reports immediately. These institutions were established in the democratization process of 
Japanese science and technology, which was promoted by GHQ/SCAP after Japan’s defeat in WWII. 
Such process was motivated by Japanese scientists’ wish for the modernization of science system. 
However as Hiroshige claimed, their wish and criticism for Japanese science system can go back to 
wartime science mobilization which also required to modernize science and technology for the 
development of weapons４７. 
Joint research in JSIA also goes way back to wartime. Some recent studies have pointed out 
that a number of joint research studies—not only between companies but also between companies 
and universities and between military and other governmental institutes—played a very important 
role in technological development, especially in postwar Japan; many of these research studies had 
been organized during wartime４８. The social changes between wartime and the reform period or the 
systemization of science and technology should not be ignored in an understanding of Japanese 
postwar technology development. 
Having been available all over the world, PB reports must have been used in various countries 
and areas. This study only concerns Japan. To identify the impact of PB reports, the cases of other 
countries should be studied. In this way, the patterns of technology transfer in various countries can 
become more discernable. 
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The data of first issue Title
1946, January Bibliography of Scientific and Industrial Reports
1947, January Bibliography of Technical Reports
1954, October U.S. Government Research Reports
1965, January U.S. Government Research & Development Reports
1971, March Government Reports Announcement
1975, April Government Reports Announcement & Index
Sorce: National Diet Library OPAC (http://opac.ndl.go.jp/index.html)
Table 1: Bibliographies of technical reports issued by the U.S. government
                 from January 1946 to January 1952
Number % Number %
Germany 55,772 52.2 5,255 70.3
United States 44,629 41.8 1,762 23.6
Japan 3,262 3.1 322 4.3
Great Britain 1,600 1.5 47 0.6
Others 1,582 1.5 91 1.2
Total 106,845 100 7,477 100
 Table 2： The total number of PB reports and its pages
Country Reports Pages
Source: Morio Uehara, “PB ripoto ka Beikoku Seifu
Kenkyu ripoto ka [PB reports or U.S. 
government research reports?]”, Saiensu
Laiburary [Science Library], 5/4-5 (1959, May),
56.
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Table 3. German engineers interrogated by the investigation team
Company and Factory Person's name Position
Anorgana G.m.b.H. Gendorf Dr. Tapperman
Ｉ.Ｇ.　Farben  Höechst Dr. Spiker Chemist in the Division of Technical Applications
Dr. Otto Wegwitz Head, Electrolytic plant, Inorganic Division
Dr. Fritz Bachran Chief, Inorganic Division
Dr. Rothweiler Head, Methyl plant.
Dr. Eggert Assistant, the Methyl plant
Dr. Huber Head,Caustic Dehydration
I.G. Farben Rheinfelden Dr. Carl Liebich Plant Manager
Dr. A. Hermann Superintendent, Elrctrolysis
Dr. H. Heres Superintendent, Caustic Concentration
Dr. E. Renshler Superintendent, Liquid Chlorine and bleach
Dr. J. Jung Superintendent, Organic division
I.G. Farben Ludwigsahfen Dr. Pfannmuller Director, Inorganic Division Ludwigshafen
Dr. Honsberg Superintendent, Chlorine Electrolysis
Dr. Hans Retschy Superintendent,  Liquid Chlorine and Caustic Soda
Dr. W. Huhn Superintendent, Alcl electrolysis
I.G. Farben Huels Dr. Paul Bauman Plant Manager
(chlorine operation) Dr. Oswin Nitzchke Division head
Dr. Ing. Erich Buttgenbach Superintendent, Cl2 and NaOH
I.G. Farben Leverkusen Dr. August Wingler Head, Azo department
Dr. Bencker Superintendent, Chlorine electrolysis
Dr. Klebert Head, Inorganic Division
Source: Joint Intelligence Objective Agency ,FIAT Final Report No.431 Survey of The Chlorine and caustic plants in 
western and southern germany (PB 7747), (Washington D.C. 1945), 1,15,18,28,40, 43,45,48.  
Table4: Production Capacity of caustic soda
(1000t)
Total Mercury Diaphragm
1939 415.8 236.9
1946
1947
1948
1949 261.0 199.0 85.8 113.2
1950 261.0 226.0 92.7 133.3
1951 301.0 261.0 112.9 148.1
1952 301.0 297.2 134.3 162.9
1953 301.0 327.5 164.5 163.0
1954 301.0 361.1 197.9 163.1
1955 301.0 389.1 220.3 168.7
1956 390.6 492.6 299.9 192.7
1957 390.6 626.5 418.0 208.5
ElectrolyticYear-end Ammonia
Source: JCIA, Nihon no Kagaku Kogyo Sengo 30-nen no Ayumi 
[A 30-years History of Japan Chemical Industry after
the war](Tokyo 1979), 63.
